ADR as a Security Risk: How Much Kremlin Is There in the ADR?



This week, at least 30 people were killed in Kyiv in a massive Russian missile and drone attack, and more than 90 were injured. Around 130 buildings were damaged, including residential buildings and medical facilities. Days later, rescue workers were still searching the rubble for missing people.

At the same time, two of the ADR’s most prominent representatives devoted a remarkable share of their political communication to an entirely different topic: Ukraine’s alleged pervasive Nazi problem.

ADR MP Fred Keup submitted a parliamentary question to Foreign Minister Xavier Bettel in which he described Andriy Melnyk as a “Nazi collaborator” and the leader of a movement with “National Socialist and antisemitic traits.” Almost simultaneously, ADR MEP Fernand Kartheiser published, in rapid succession, videos about Melnyk, Bandera and the alleged glorification of Ukrainian Nazis.

What is particularly striking is the similarity between Fred Keup’s parliamentary question and Moscow’s official communication. The Russian Foreign Ministry portrayed Andriy Melnyk as a “Nazi collaborator,” interpreted his exhumation and repatriation as a state honour, and constructed a diplomatic scandal around it. The Luxembourg ambassador was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Keup’s parliamentary question contains almost exactly the same argumentative construction. Melnyk is defined as a “clearly identified” Nazi collaborator, the ceremony is framed as “state mourning and honouring,” and this is immediately followed by a reference to Russia summoning the Luxembourg ambassador. The parallel therefore goes beyond individual terms. The entire dramaturgy of the argument is almost identical: Nazi collaborator, state honour, moral scandal, Luxembourg must explain itself.

Added to this is the fact that, within a matter of days, Keup and Kartheiser focused on the same thematic fields: Melnyk, Bandera, Ukrainian nationalism and alleged Nazi glorification. A political line is emerging that shows a striking overlap with one of the oldest and most important narratives of Russian propaganda: the systematic reduction of Ukrainian history, the Ukrainian struggle for independence and, ultimately, Ukraine itself to the word “Nazi.”

This narrative is not a peripheral element of Russian information policy. The alleged “denazification” of Ukraine is one of the central justifications for Russia’s war of aggression. For years, Russian propaganda has attempted to remove complex and, in some cases, genuinely dark chapters of Ukrainian history from their historical context and construct from them a political continuity between individual nationalist movements of the 20th century and today’s democratic Ukraine.

Historical figures such as Melnyk or Bandera must be critically examined. Antisemitism, collaboration and violence within nationalist movements belong in the historical debate and must neither be relativised nor concealed. Russian propaganda, however, uses genuine historical controversies as raw material. Contradictions and historical contexts disappear until history itself becomes a political weapon against the legitimacy of today’s Ukraine. Only Soviet historiography, with its centralised view from Moscow, is treated as credible.

When leading representatives of a Luxembourg political party place precisely these themes at the centre of their communication within a matter of days, while Russia is simultaneously bombing Ukrainian cities and killing civilians, it is legitimate to identify the political function of this choice of emphasis. Responsibility of the aggressor disappears from the centre of attention, while the country under attack is once again placed in the dock.

Questions surrounding the ADR are not new

My concern about the development of the ADR is not based solely on this current campaign. At the end of May, the Tageblatt published an editorial entitled: “Is the ADR spying on Luxembourg for Moscow? There is no evidence, but there are questions.”

The article documented a series of events that go beyond mere expressions of sympathy and deserve serious public debate. ADR MP Tom Weidig, for example, questioned the government about suspicious drone flights, including near energy infrastructure, the airport and government buildings. His parliamentary question also concerned technical systems for detection and identification, possible means of neutralising drones, responsibilities, emergency procedures and the permanent protection of critical infrastructure. The government explicitly refused to provide technical details on grounds of national security.

Another ADR MP, Dan Hardy, submitted questions about Luxembourg’s protection mechanisms against disinformation, cyber risks and foreign interference.

Each of these parliamentary questions, taken individually, can be part of legitimate democratic oversight. What becomes politically relevant, however, is the broader context in which they are asked. While ADR MPs in the national parliament seek information about sensitive security mechanisms and the defence against foreign interference, the party’s most prominent foreign-policy representative maintains intensive contacts with Russia.

According to European Parliament transparency information analysed by the Tageblatt, Fernand Kartheiser participated in the Moscow Economic Forum on 8 April 2026 and, only a few days later, on 17 April, met the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian State Duma in Istanbul. The Tageblatt also refers to reports according to which Kartheiser invited other Members of the European Parliament to a meeting with Russian politicians in St Petersburg.

There is currently no publicly available evidence that ADR parliamentary questions were submitted on behalf of Russia. The relevant point lies in the accumulation of documented events: questions concerning sensitive areas of national security, recurring political contacts with Russia, appearances at Russian events and a foreign-policy discourse that regularly overlaps with Moscow’s interests and narratives.

In this context, the Tageblatt refers to the so-called mosaic principle. Individual pieces of information may appear harmless in isolation, but when assembled they can create a more detailed picture of responsibilities, reporting procedures and possible vulnerabilities. At the same time, the newspaper explicitly states that no systematic pattern of intelligence gathering has yet been established. This distinction is important, because a democratic debate about security risks does not require conspiracy theories. The documented contacts, journeys, questions and political narratives are entirely sufficient reason to take a closer look.

Against this background, the current Melnyk and Bandera campaigns acquire a different significance. The question is no longer simply whether an individual phrase happens to resemble Russian terminology. The broader picture includes repeated political contacts with Russia, appearances at Russia-linked events, a foreign-policy line that regularly accommodates Russian positions, and now a communication campaign whose choice of topics and framing strikingly overlap with Russia’s current official campaign against Ukraine.

Keup and Kartheiser are now doing Moscow’s work with such political energy that, as a journalist, one seriously wonders how much longer we will have to wait for the smoking gun. Clear evidence of direct coordination has not yet emerged. The trips to Russia, political contacts, security-related parliamentary questions and almost serial adoption of Russian narratives, however, are documented. Journalism has a responsibility to follow such trails before the evidence is conveniently sitting on the table, not only afterwards.

The AfD-isation of the ADR

The AfD-isation of the ADR is becoming increasingly difficult to overlook. It can be seen in the choice of topics, in the political language, in international contacts and in the growing adoption of interpretative frameworks that serve the Kremlin’s foreign-policy interests.

The party is moving ever more clearly in a direction familiar from Germany: more radical in its language, more aggressive towards Ukraine, more understanding of Russian positions and increasingly sceptical of European support for a country that has been attacked by Russia.

The timing of recent days is politically remarkable. While Russian missiles and drones killed at least 30 people in Kyiv, destroyed entire residential buildings and left rescue workers searching for missing people in the rubble for days, leading ADR politicians were preoccupied with Melnyk, Bandera and Ukrainian Nazis.

The victims of Russia’s war of aggression faded into the background. Instead, Ukraine was once again viewed through the historical and political categories Moscow has used for decades to delegitimise its independence and statehood. One could also call these Nazi methods.

For a democracy such as Luxembourg, this development is not a marginal matter of party politics. Alongside its military war against Ukraine, Russia has been conducting an information war in Europe for years. The objective is to weaken support for Ukraine, polarise European societies, undermine trust in democratic institutions and gradually shift responsibility for the war from the aggressor onto the country under attack.

If a party represented in the Luxembourg parliament increasingly introduces narratives into public debate that serve precisely these strategic objectives, while the political contacts of its most prominent European politician with Russia are documented and its national MPs submit detailed questions concerning security-sensitive structures, then the development of the ADR becomes a question of democratic security.

Political opposition is part of democracy, including radical opposition. But a resilient democracy must also remain vigilant when a political party increasingly normalises the narratives of an authoritarian state that openly regards Europe as an adversary, is waging a war of aggression on the continent and has spent years attempting to weaken European democracies from within.

The ADR, and its Russia policy in particular, therefore deserves far more critical journalistic and political scrutiny than it has received so far.





Leave a comment